

CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS

GCE Advanced Subsidiary Level and GCE Advanced Level

MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2013 series

9697 HISTORY

9697/33

Paper 3, maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

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GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will not be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	21–25	The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks.
2	18–20	Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.
3	16–17	Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.
4	14–15	Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.
5	11–13	Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.
6	8–10	Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.
7	0–7	Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent.

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Section A

1 'The Soviet Union's decision to boycott meetings of the UN Security Council in 1950 was a major error.' How far do Sources A–E support this view?

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about the Soviet boycott and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE **OR** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE **AND** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE **OR** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE **AND** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS **EITHER** (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, **OR** (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing/disagreeing is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

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Please note:

Y supports the hypothesis

N against the hypothesis

Neutral neither supports nor opposes hypothesis

Context

In January 1950, the USSR began a boycott of Security Council meetings, apparently because the UN refused to replace the Nationalist Chinese membership with that of the PRC. In June 1950 North Korea attacked South Korea. In the absence of the Soviet delegation the USA was able to gain UN support for military action against North Korea. Subsequent Soviet claims that such actions were illegal because they were resolved by the Security Council in the absence of the USSR came to nothing. The general consensus is that the USSR was wrong to be absent from the Security Council at such a sensitive time. However, an alternative interpretation is that this was part of a plan by Stalin to encourage US military involvement in Southeast Asia.

Source A

Context: Modern newspaper article reflecting on events in 1950.

Content (Face Value): The USSR's boycott 'backfired', since it allowed the USA to force through its wish for the Security Council to take action in defence of South Korea. Had the Soviet delegates been present, UN action could have been prevented by use of the USSR's right of veto. (**Y – the boycott enabled the USA to get the UN to take action in Korea against the wishes of the USSR.**)

Content (Beyond Face Value): As a newspaper article, the source is rather simplistic and applies only one interpretation of the possible reasons for the USSR's decision – i.e. anger at the UN's decision not to replace the Nationalist Chinese with representatives of the new PRC. The use of language (e.g. 'Malik stormed out.') implies that the USSR was acting in a petulant manner. The article then claims that the USA was able to take advantage of this in order to persuade the UN to take action over Korea, stressing that the resulting military action was taken for the first time in the UN's history. While the article has the advantage of hindsight, it fails to explore other possible motives which the USSR may have had for boycotting the Security Council (**X-Ref with Sources B and D**). However, this is not surprising given that it was written for a modern audience largely unfamiliar with the finer points of Cold War rivalry/diplomacy in the 1950s. (**Y, but the article has limitations and shows traits of anti-Soviet bias.**)

Source B

Context: Letter from Stalin in August 1950 to the Czech president. Eastern European leaders were concerned about the USSR's decision to boycott the Security Council, especially given that this had allowed the USA to encourage the UN to take action in Korea. The letter was written after the Soviet Union had returned to the Security Council.

Content (Face Value): The USSR boycotted the Security Council for many reasons, not just because the UN refused to allow the entry of communist China. The main claim is that the USSR boycotted the Security Council so that the USA would lose international prestige and become embroiled in conflict in Asia. This would be to the advantage of the USSR. (**N – Stalin claims that the aims of the boycott had been met.**)

Content (Beyond Face Value): The USSR's stated reason for boycotting the Security Council was the UN's refusal to give China's UN seat to the new communist regime (**X-Ref – Sources A and C both assume that this was the only reason for the boycott**). The USSR wanted this in order to gain a communist ally in a UN which it viewed as pro-Western/American. The conventional view is that the boycott 'backfired' (**Source A**) because it enabled the USA to take military action against communist North Korea with the active support of the UN. In this letter, Stalin claims that he was not surprised by the fact that the USA took advantage of the Soviet boycott to take military action in

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Korea. Also he says that he wanted this to happen because it would lower American prestige, show the USA to be aggressive yet not as militarily strong as she claimed to be and tie the USA down in conflict in the East.

Stalin claims that he deliberately set-up a situation which would allow the USA to make a fundamental mistake by getting involved in Korea (**N – far from backfiring, the boycott achieved exactly what it set out to achieve**). However, the reliability of this claim must be analysed. Stalin's decision to boycott the Security Council was being questioned (and even challenged) by leaders of Eastern European states, and it could be argued that this letter is an attempt by Stalin to save face (**Y – Stalin is seeking to justify a strategy which had gone wrong, especially in view of the USSR's failure to overturn resolutions passed in its absence. X-Ref with Source E.**). However Stalin knew in advance that North Korea would invade South Korea in June. It remains uncertain why the USSR did not return to the Security Council in June to block any move which the USA might make against this invasion. It is possible that Stalin simply didn't believe that the USA would want to get involved in Korea (outside its stated defence perimeter), but why take this risk? Stalin wrote this letter at a time when the USA/UN seemed to be winning the war against North Korea. Despite this, the letter accurately predicts events – e.g. the USA/UN's decision to attack beyond the North Korean border (roll-back), which brought the Chinese into the war and tied the USA down to a long and bloody conflict in Korea. As a result, the USA was diverted away from Europe, thus giving the USSR greater time in which to secure its own position (**X-Ref Source D**). The Korean War showed up weaknesses in the USA's foreign policy and in her military strength – the USA's refusal to use nuclear weapons provided the USSR with useful information. These points might suggest that Stalin was telling the truth (**N – the USSR set out what it intended to achieve**). Stalin was either trying to save face for the failure of his decision to maintain the boycott of the Security Council into June 1950 or he was responsible for a very clever strategy.

Source C

Context: Extract from an academic book focusing on issues relating to international law.

Content (Face Value): The source implies that the USSR's boycott enabled the Security Council to take action in Korea of which the USSR did not approve. Soviet attempts to challenge the legality of the resolutions passed in their absence failed. (**Y – while the USSR was boycotting the Security Council over one issue, the Council passed resolutions on another to the detriment of Soviet interests.**)

Content (Beyond Face Value): Inevitably, given the nature of the book from which it comes, this source concentrates on the legal aspects of the Soviet boycott and is not really concerned with Soviet motives. It assumes that the Soviet's stated reason for the boycott (issues over China's membership of the UN) was the USSR's only motive (**X-Ref with Source A. Sources B and D suggest that the USSR had other, more subtle, motives**). The source implies that Soviet attempts to challenge the legality of Security Council resolutions made in the USSR's absence were doomed to failure since the USSR's absence was a breach of the UN Charter (**Y – the boycott was effectively an illegal act and diplomatically inept**). However, it must be remembered that the source's utility is limited by its purpose/intended audience.

Source D

Context: A modern academic's assessment of Stalin's strategy in 1950.

Content (Face Value): While accepting that the conventional view is that the boycott backfired because it provided the USA with the opportunity to gain UN support and approval for action against communist North Korea, the source argues that Stalin deliberately boycotted the Security Council so that the USA could do so. This would give Stalin time to strengthen the USSR's position in Europe

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prior to the expected Third World War (**N – Stalin deliberately created a situation in which the USA would become entangled in war in Korea and was thus diverted from Europe**).

Content (Beyond Face Value): The source largely accepts Stalin’s version of his motives for the boycott (**X-Ref with Source B**). He deliberately created a situation in which the USA would be able to lure the UN into the Korean conflict. This would explain why the USSR did not return to the Security Council to block resolutions against North Korea, even though Stalin knew that the North Koreans would invade South Korea in June 1950 (**N – the boycott was a plan to entice the USA into taking action against North Korea. Stalin knew that the Chinese would become involved, thus tying the USA down in the East while he developed Soviet security in Europe**). It could be argued that this source is naive in believing the version given in Source B (**X-Ref**). Could Stalin really have predicted subsequent events in order to develop such a strategy? There is evidence to suggest that Stalin neither expected nor wanted US involvement in Korea. (**X-Ref with Source E which clearly does not accept the truth of Stalin’s letter.**) It could be argued that this source too readily accepts that Stalin was telling the truth in his letter.

Source E

Context: A modern academic’s assessment of Stalin’s strategy in 1950.

Content (Face Value): The Soviet boycott backfired. Stalin did not want US involvement in Korea, yet the boycott enabled the USA to act quickly and to push the North Koreans back. By August 1950, the USA and her allies were actively discussing war against the USSR itself. The fact that Stalin’s aides were opposed to the boycott suggests that they were afraid that it would give the USA too much power over the UN when it came to decisions about the Korean War. (**Y – the boycott enabled the USA to take the initiative in the UN, in Korea and in the global confrontation against Soviet-inspired communism.**)

Content (Beyond Face Value): This source does not accept Stalin’s justification of the Soviet Boycott (**Source B**). Far from wanting to entice the USA into taking action against North Korea, the USSR did everything it could to prevent US involvement. If Stalin was telling the truth in his letter (**Source B**), his aides were unaware of his strategy – why else would they argue that the USSR should return to the Security Council to block the USA’s attempts to gain support for resolutions regarding Korea? The implication is that, by June, Stalin had come to realise that the boycott was a mistake, but was afraid to return to the Security Council for fear of this leading to a direct military confrontation with the USA. (**Y – the Soviet boycott enabled the USA to take action in Korea with the blessing and support of the UN, and also to encourage her allies to prepare for war against the USSR.**) (**X-Ref with Source A, which also believes that the Soviet boycott backfired.**) However, it could be argued that this source too readily dismisses the possibility that Stalin was telling the truth (**X-Ref with Source D, which says suggests exactly this**). Perhaps Stalin had created a no-lose situation – if the USA had not taken action against North Korea, South Korea would have been overrun and communism would have spread (heightening the power and prestige of the USSR). If the USA did intervene, then this would tie them down in a war against North Korea and China, thus enabling the USSR to strengthen its position in Europe. This, too, would explain why Stalin was opposed to returning to the Security Council in June 1950 (**N – perhaps Stalin’s explanation in Source B was truthful**). Nevertheless, this would still not explain why Stalin’s aides were unaware of the strategy (**Y on balance**).

Conclusion

It could be argued that Stalin made a major error when he ordered the boycott of the Security Council in January 1950, and especially when he ordered its continuation into June when North Korea attacked South Korea. The boycott enabled the USA to take action in Korea with the blessing and support of the UN. The USA was able to convince the UN that the North Korean attack was part of a larger communist plot for ‘world domination’. However, it could equally be argued that Stalin

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deliberately created a situation in which the USA was enticed into a debilitating war in Korea and an extended involvement in Southeast Asia which lowered US international prestige, diverted US attention from Europe and delayed the possibility of World War 3. On balance, the former argument seems more plausible.

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Section B

2 To what extent was the development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949 the result of American determination to gain economic mastery over Europe?

It could be argued that, having endured the Great Depression, the USA was determined to avoid the dangers of isolationism in the future. A key element in this was ensuring American economic supremacy. This involved rebuilding the war-shattered economies of Europe, Japan etc. The Marshall Plan was part of the process of making Western Europe economically dependent upon the USA. To the Soviet Union, effectively denied American economic assistance through the ending of lend-lease, this was 'dollar imperialism'. The USA had a vested interest in restoring the German economy – this was at odds with the USSR's desire to keep Germany weak (to avoid the prospect of future attacks) and to extract reparations from it. From the Soviet perspective, the USA's economic activities were designed to make Western Europe politically, as well as economically, dependent on America. This added to Stalin's paranoia regarding the security of the Soviet Union. Revisionist historians would argue that the USA's economic policies regarding Europe (1945–49) were a fundamental cause of the Cold War.

On the other hand, traditionalists would argue that the USA was merely trying to help Europe rebuild following the traumas of WW2, and that the Cold War developed because of Stalin's aggressive and expansionist policies in Eastern Europe. In response to Soviet expansionism, the USA instituted the Truman Doctrine to protect Western Europe and the Marshall Plan to facilitate economic rebuilding. Post-revisionists would argue that both the USA and the USSR were merely seeking to ensure their own security, and that they misunderstood each others' motives.

3 'The Cold War was globalised between 1950 and 1980 despite the fact that neither the USA nor the USSR had expansionist ambitions.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the globalisation of the Cold War occurred because of the USA's over-reaction to what it perceived as a Soviet attempt to spread world-wide communist revolution. Such fears were enhanced after the fall of China to communism in 1949; the USA saw the USSR and the PRC as forming a communist bloc which posed a genuine threat to American interests. The USA adopted containment, NSC-68, roll back, the domino theory and became directly involved in a series of regional conflicts, the causes of which were more to do with post-colonial nationalism than communist world domination. Unwelcome American intervention often led such countries to seek help and support from the USSR, thus spreading the Cold War. Globalisation occurred not because of the expansionist ambitions of the superpowers, but because of fear and the need for the USA and the USSR to maintain their respective political, economic, strategic and prestige interests.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the USSR had expansionist ambitions, as evidenced by Stalin's statements regarding world revolution (a view shared by Khrushchev, although he believed it would occur naturally), Soviet support for the communist take-over in China and Soviet involvement in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Africa and the Middle East. Similarly, American involvement in essentially regional issues could be seen as evidence of the USA's determination to secure and expand her own economic, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. American support for unpopular and undemocratic regimes in many countries, together with illicit CIA activities across the globe, could be cited as further evidence.

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4 To what extent was the Soviet Union responsible for the American defeat in the Vietnam War?

The USA believed that there was a communist plot to dominate the world, orchestrated by the USSR together with China. Containment and fear of the 'domino effect' meant that the USA had to take a stand in Vietnam to prevent communism spreading to areas of vital strategic and economic importance (e.g. Japan). The USSR supplied arms and other military equipment to the Vietcong, via North Vietnam. After 1970, Russian weapons were vital to the Vietcong. US President Johnson was concerned that American intervention on a large scale would bring China into the war. This effectively ruled out the use of nuclear weapons to end a war which military experts informed Johnson could not be won 'at any reasonable cost'.

However, it could be argued that the USA's defeat owed more to its own mistakes than to the actions of the USSR. The idea of a communist plot was wrong, as eventually acknowledged by President Nixon. Sino-Soviet tensions were already present. The USA claimed to be supporting the independence of the Vietnamese people, but in reality supported an unpopular, undemocratic and brutal regime. The gradual build-up of American involvement under Eisenhower and Kennedy left Johnson little choice but to increase the scale of American military action in Vietnam. Unlike in Korea, the USA acted alone. The USA consistently failed to understand the true nature of the war, which was a nationalistic war of independence and unification in the wake of de-colonisation. By supporting an unpopular regime, the USA encouraged the spread of communism in the South, and never came to terms with the guerrilla tactics or the resilience displayed by the Vietcong. Public opinion in the USA also turned against the war due to excessive bombing, the use of chemicals and the My Lai massacre.

5 'China's determination to play a leading role in the world communist movement after 1949 was the main reason for the Sino-Soviet split.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that although Mao had considered himself junior to Stalin he considered himself to be senior to Khrushchev in the world communist movement. Mao was openly critical of Khrushchev's policy of Peaceful Coexistence, which he felt showed communist weakness towards capitalism. China increasingly claimed that Khrushchev was weakening the communist movement with ideological revisionism (as demonstrated by Khrushchev's 1956 speech in which he criticised Stalin), whereas China remained loyal to the true form of communism as preached by Stalin. China's determination to play a leading role in the world communist movement was continually thwarted by the USSR which possessed atomic weapons and ICBM technology which it refused to share with China.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that there were other, more significant, reasons for the Sino-Soviet split. While it had been expedient for both countries to sign to Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950, there were conflicts between the national interests of the PRC and the USSR. These were manifested in border disputes (e.g. in Mongolia). The large Soviet military presence along the Chinese border was a constant cause of concern to the PRC. Communism had developed in different ways in China and the Soviet Union, as reflected in Khrushchev's criticisms of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Much of Mao's domestic policy had been based on Stalinism, and Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin were threatening to Mao. The combination of conflicting national interests and the USSR's refusal to allow China a greater say in world communist leadership were, arguably, more significant than China's desire to gain great power.

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6 How effective were the SALT Treaties in limiting the threat of nuclear war?

It could be argued that the SALT Treaties marked the high point of détente. The ABM treaty reduced the tension caused by the destabilising impact of defensive systems; it provided a deterrence, since an attacker would know that the enemy had the power to retaliate. The Interim Treaty placed limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs which each side was allowed. The Basic Principles Agreement laid down rules for the conduct of nuclear war, both the USA and the USSR agreeing to ‘exercise restraint’ in international relations, while there was a greater willingness to extend trading connections. This was indicative of a desire on both sides to move away from confrontation.

In order to create balance, it could be argued that the long drawn-out nature of discussions leading to SALT I was indicative of the problem of reaching agreement. The differing weapons systems of the two sides made comparison difficult, while the focus was on existing weapons the USA was already developing new weapons. The Interim Treaty, for example, omitted new technological developments such as MIRVs. This gave a clear advantage to the USA. The USSR only signed SALT I because of its fear of improving relations between the USA and China. Each power retained sufficient offensive weapons to destroy each other several times over. SALT I was an interim agreement. SALT II aimed to set equal limits for missile launchers and strategic bombers, but omitted cruise missiles where the USA had a significant lead. Right-wing Americans opposed SALT II, and it was never ratified due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, SALT was a signal of intent rather than achieving anything substantial.

7 Assess the impact of Japan’s ‘economic miracle’ on the international economy.

Japan’s rapid post-war economic recovery was based on a fortunate combination of favourable internal and external factors. Japan experienced huge economic growth, at an average of 8% annually from 1955–59, 10% annually in the 1960s, 5% in the 1970s and 4% in the 1980s. Japan concentrated on the production of high-technology goods, both for the domestic market (assisted by a government initiative to double incomes) and for export. Japan gained a reputation for quality and reliability, and her products were highly competitive in foreign markets. Throughout the 1960s, Japan’s exports expanded at an annual rate of 15%. By 1972, Japan had overtaken West Germany to become the world’s third largest economy, specialising in shipbuilding, radio, television, hi-fi equipment, cameras, steel, motor vehicles and textiles. Japan raised protective tariffs to keep out imports in order to protect her own products in the domestic market. However, Japan also benefited from the Bretton Woods financial and trading system, with its fixed exchange rates and steady reduction of protection tariffs; this facilitated the growth of international trade, which was vital to a Japanese economy primarily based on exports. As a result of Cold War policies, the USA tolerated Japan’s use of protectionist restrictions and also gave Japan special advantages within the American market. By 1965, the USA suffered its first trade deficit with Japan. There were constant protests from US businessmen and their counterparts in Canada and Western Europe that the Japanese were flooding foreign markets with their exports while refusing to buy a comparable amount of imports. Nixon’s devaluation of the dollar in 1971 ended the Bretton Woods system and the USA’s ‘special trading favours’ to Japan. Japan looked to find new trading partners, for example by improved relations with the USSR and the PRC, but also by providing overseas development aid to members of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) and Third World areas. Japan suffered recessions during the oil crises of 1973–74 and 1979–81, which exposed her over-reliance on oil from the Middle East. However, Japan coped with these world-wide recessions better than most other industrialised countries and, by the mid-1980s her GNP amounted to about one-tenth of world output. With her massive export trade and relatively modest domestic consumption, Japan enjoyed an enormous trade surplus, was the world’s leading creditor nation and gave away more in development aid than any other country. By the end of the 1980s, Japan was beginning to establish car, electronics and textile factories in the USA, UK and Europe.

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8 How significant was the Brandt Report in the development of North-South relations?

In terms of effectiveness, it could be argued that the Report raised awareness of what it termed the North-South Divide, highlighting the differences between the developed industrial nations of the North and the poverty of the South (containing most of the Third World countries). It concluded that the North was getting richer and the South was getting poorer, and that this was in nobody's interests. It recommended a series of positive steps which could be taken:

- it would be in the North's interest to help the South become more prosperous (bigger markets etc.)
- rich nations should aim to give 0.7% of their national income to poorer nations by 1985 and 1% by 2000
- New World Development Fund to be established
- International Food Programme introduced
- campaign to improve farming methods in South.

However, conditions in the Third World continued to deteriorate. By 1985, only Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France had met the target of 0.7% – USA only 0.24% and GB 0.11%. Third World countries remained adversely affected by the problems of neo-colonialism, dependence on one-product economies, rising prices of manufactured goods, high rates of interest on loans, activities of multi-national companies, high population growth, political instability and corrupt and inefficient governments. Problems were made worse by famine in Africa in the mid-1980s. The Brandt Report, while raising awareness of the problem, achieved relatively little in the short term.