



UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS
General Certificate of Education
Advanced Subsidiary Level and Advanced Level

HISTORY

9697/33

Paper 3 International History, 1945–1991

October/November 2011

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

You may use a soft pencil for any rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **three** questions.

You must **not** answer both Question 3 and Question 4.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

This document consists of **4** printed pages.



Section A: The Development of the United Nations, 1945–1991

You **must** answer Question 1.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BUILD UP TO THE SIX DAY WAR, 1967

- 1 Read the Sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the Sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

The presence of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt has kept tensions down. Yet Egyptian President Nasser has formally requested the withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt. It really makes a mockery of the peacekeeping work of the UN if, as soon as the tension rises, the UN is told to leave. Indeed the collapse of UNEF might well have repercussions on other UN peacekeeping forces and the credibility of the UN. Any decision to withdraw UNEF should be taken in the UN after full consultation with all countries involved; it should not be a unilateral decision.

George Brown, British Foreign Secretary, speaking on 18 May 1967.

Source B

UNEF has discharged its responsibilities with remarkable effectiveness and distinction. It has been active for ten and a half years and that is a very long time for any country to have foreign troops, even under an international banner, on its soil. UN peacekeeping operations such as UNEF depend for their presence and effectiveness on the consent, cooperation and good will of the authorities in their area of deployment. When the Egyptian Government decided to move its troops up to the border, which it had a perfect right to do, the buffer function which UNEF had been performing was eliminated. Its continued presence was rendered useless, its position untenable, and its withdrawal became virtually inevitable. This was the case even before the official request for the withdrawal had been received by me. UNEF is a peacekeeping not an enforcement operation; a symbolic force of just 3400 men. I have given the order for the withdrawal of UNEF. The timing of the withdrawal of UNEF leaves much to be desired because of the prevailing tensions throughout the area.

UN Secretary-General U Thant addressing the UN Security Council, 20 May 1967.

Source C

On 16 May 1967, UNEF's Commander was asked by the Chief of Staff of Egypt's armed forces to order an immediate withdrawal from the border. Thereupon, the UN Force began to suffer some harassment and was forced to abandon two of its observation posts. UN Secretary-General U Thant formally concluded the duties of the Force on 19 May. Egyptian forces gathered in large numbers on the frontier and on 22 May President Nasser announced a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. The crisis deepened and war broke out with a pre-emptive Israeli strike on 5 June. For his decision, U Thant was bitterly attacked from many sides. An article in the New York Times stated that the Secretary-General had 'used his international prestige with the objectivity of a spurned lover and the dynamism of a noodle' and likened UNEF to 'a fire brigade which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first flames appear.' The British politician Sir Alec Douglas-Home felt that 'the authority of the Secretary-General and the credibility of the UN itself was gravely damaged by the withdrawal of UNEF.'

From an article entitled 'U Thant and his Critics', 1972.

Source D

U Thant's initial response to Nasser's request for the withdrawal of UNEF was 'I can't do that because UNEF has a task and there is a good faith agreement between us.' Nasser moved Egyptian troops to take over some key areas. Yugoslavia and India withdrew their UNEF troops immediately, so we had lost the entire infantry before we even knew about it. Nasser had the right to demand UNEF's withdrawal; it was his territory. As a purely practical matter, there was no way you could keep UNEF in there if the Egyptian army wished to stop it. All of the supplies came up through the desert and it would take only a squad of the Egyptian army to simply block the roads. When they said they were going to do this, the Canadians withdrew their contingent because they felt unsafe. The Americans, British and Canadians said that U Thant was caving in to the Egyptian dictator. This made Nasser more determined and, whilst U Thant was on his way to Cairo to speak with him, Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. The Israelis had always said that they would go to war if this was done, and they were now determined to go ahead with military operations.

Sir Brian Urquhart, Senior Adviser to the UN Secretary-General from 1945 to 1986, speaking in October, 1984.

Source E

Originally intended to be a short-term emergency force, UNEF had helped keep the Arabs and Israelis from engaging in open war for ten years. In 1964, the Arab League, armed with Soviet-made weaponry and numerically superior to the Israelis, officially declared its desire to achieve 'the final liquidation of Israel.' The problem was UNEF; it was necessary to get the UN out of the line of fire. In 1967, Nasser demanded that UNEF leave the buffer zone. Unfortunately, the UN Secretary-General believed that the UN could not maintain itself on the Egyptian border without the permission of the host country and ordered a withdrawal. The decline of the UN's peacekeeping as a serious international force may have begun with UNEF's abandonment of its mission.

From an article in the 'Middle East Review of International Affairs', 2005.

Now answer the following question.

'UN Secretary-General U Thant was guilty of a fatal error of judgement when he ordered the withdrawal of UNEF in May 1967.' How far do Sources A–E support this view?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

You must **not** answer both Question 3 and Question 4.

- 2 'In 1945 Europe was devastated both politically and economically.' How far does this explain the outbreak of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949?
- 3 'The globalisation of the Cold War between 1950 and 1980 was entirely due to the USA's fear of communism.' How far do you agree?

OR

- 4 'A gamble that failed.' How fair is this evaluation of Khrushchev's decision to install nuclear weapons in Cuba?
- 5 'The power of the Chinese Communist Party was never under serious threat at any time in the 1980s.' How far do you agree?
- 6 How successful were attempts to control the development of nuclear weapons between 1949 and 1980?
- 7 To what extent was the success of the international economy dependent upon the success of the US economy in the period from 1945 to 1991?
- 8 'Internal rather than external factors better explain the emergence of the Asian Tiger economies.' How far do you agree?

Copyright Acknowledgements:

Source C © Alan James; *U Thant and his Critics*; The Year Book of World Affairs; The London Institute of World Affairs; Stevens and Sons Ltd.
Source E © Middle East Review of International Affairs; 2005.

Permission to reproduce items where third-party owned material protected by copyright is included has been sought and cleared where possible. Every reasonable effort has been made by the publisher (UCLES) to trace copyright holders, but if any items requiring clearance have unwittingly been included, the publisher will be pleased to make amends at the earliest possible opportunity.

University of Cambridge International Examinations is part of the Cambridge Assessment Group. Cambridge Assessment is the brand name of University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate (UCLES), which is itself a department of the University of Cambridge.