



**Section A: Topic 1****The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939**

- 1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

No doubt it benefited the Indian economy little to maintain one of the world's largest standing armies as a mercenary force. Yet recent research casts doubt on other aspects of the nationalist critique of Indian 'underdevelopment' under British rule. The destruction of jobs in the Indian textile industry was probably inevitable, regardless of who ruled India, and an equal if not greater number of new jobs were created in new economic sectors built up by the British. Even in the case of textiles, by the 1920s the Government of India was clearly giving preference to Indian manufacturers over Lancashire's mills. One can also doubt that taxation under the British was excessive; the land tax burden fell from around ten per cent of net output in the 1850s to five per cent by the 1930s. The supposed 'drain' of capital from India to Britain turns out to have been comparatively modest: only about 0.9 to 1.3 per cent of Indian national income from 1868 to the 1930s, according to one estimate of the export surplus (which was what nationalists usually had in mind). In any case, a great deal of government expenditure was in fact incurred for services that India needed but could not supply on her own. Finally, the prospect of devastating famines once every few years was inherent in India's ecology, since they were primarily environmental in origin, and after 1900 the problem was alleviated by the greater integration of the Indian market for foodstuffs. The Bengal famine of 1943 arose precisely because improvements introduced under British rule collapsed under the strain of the Second World War.

Moreover, British rule had some distinctly positive effects. It greatly increased the importance of trade, from between one and two per cent of national income to over twenty per cent by 1913. The British created an integrated Indian market: they unified weights, measures and the currency, abolished transit duties and introduced a legal framework which promoted private property rights and contract law more explicitly. They invested substantially in repairing and enlarging the country's ancient irrigation system. As is well known, the British transformed the Indian system of communications, introducing a postal and telegraph system, deploying steamships on internal waterways and building more than 40,000 miles of railway track (roughly five times the amount constructed in China in the same period). The railway network alone employed more than a million people by the last decade of British rule. Finally, there was a significant increase in the availability of finance. By comparison with the other major Asian empire – China, which remained under Asian political control – India fared well. The Chinese economy shrank, even if some of its troubles can doubtless be attributed to the disruptive influence of informal European imperialism.

The explanation for the disappointing impact of these improvements on per capita incomes lies not in British exploitation, but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. The British expanded Indian education – but not enough to make a real impact on the quality of human capital. The number of Indians in education may have increased sevenfold between 1881 and 1941, but the proportion of the population in primary and secondary education was far below European rates (two per cent in India in 1913, against sixteen per cent in Britain). The British invested in India – but not enough to pull most Indian farmers up off the base line of subsistence. The British built hospitals and banks – but not enough of them to make significant improvements in public health and credit networks.

*What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]*

**Section B: Topic 2****The Holocaust**

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

I offered a portrayal of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 that was multi-layered. Different groups within the battalion behaved in different ways. The ‘eager killers’ – whose numbers increased over time – sought the opportunity to kill, and celebrated their murderous deeds. The smallest group within the battalion comprised the non-shooters. With the exception of Lieutenant Buchmann, they did not make principled objections against the regime and its murderous policies; they did not reproach their comrades. They took advantage of the policy within the battalion of exempting those who ‘didn’t feel up to it’, and those who said that they were too weak or that they had children.

The rest of the battalion, the largest group, did whatever they were asked to do, without ever taking the risk of confronting authority or appearing weak, but they did not volunteer for or celebrate the killing. Increasingly numb and brutalised, they felt more pity for themselves, because of the ‘unpleasant’ work they had been assigned, than they did for their dehumanised victims. For the most part, they did not think what they were doing was wrong or immoral, because the killing was sanctioned by legitimate authority. Indeed, for the most part they did not try to think at all. As one policeman stated: ‘Truthfully, I must say that at the time we didn’t reflect about it at all. Only years later did any of us become truly conscious of what had happened then.’ Heavy drinking helped: ‘Most of the other men drank so much solely because of the many shootings of Jews, for such a life was quite intolerable when sober.’ That these policemen were ‘willing executioners’ does not mean that they wanted to be genocidal executioners.

In addition to a multi-layered portrayal of the battalion, I offered a multi-causal explanation of motivation. I noted the importance of conformity, peer pressure, and deference to authority, and I should have emphasised more explicitly the legitimising capacities of government. I also emphasised the mutually intensifying effects of war and racism, as the years of anti-Semitic propaganda dovetailed with the polarising effects of war. I argued that nothing helped the Nazis to wage a race war so much as the war itself, as the distinction between racially superior Germans and racially inferior Jews, central to Nazi ideology, could easily merge with the image of a beleaguered Germany surrounded by enemies. Ordinary Germans did not have to be of one mind with Hitler’s demonological view of the Jews to carry out genocide. A combination of situational and ideological factors that concurred about the enemy status and dehumanisation of the victims was sufficient to turn ‘ordinary men’ into ‘willing executioners’. The example of the group of men from Luxembourg in Reserve Police Battalion 101 offers the rare opportunity of comparing people in the same situation but of different cultural backgrounds. While the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive, I noted that the 14 Luxembourgers seem to have behaved very much like their German colleagues, implying that situational factors were very strong indeed.

*What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer.* [40]

## Section C: Topic 3

## The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

- 3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Here, then, was the difficulty. The Western democracies sought a form of security that would reject violence or the threat of it: security would be a collective good, not a benefit to be denied to some in order to provide it to others. Stalin saw things very differently: security came only by intimidating or eliminating potential challengers. World politics was an extension of Soviet politics, which was in turn an extension of Stalin's preferred personal environment: a zero-sum game, in which achieving security for one meant depriving everyone else of it. The contrast, or so it would seem, made conflict inevitable.

But is this not putting things too starkly? The United States and its democratic allies found ways to cooperate with the Soviet Union, after all, in fighting Germany and Japan. Could they not have managed their post-war relationship similarly, so that the safety Stalin demanded could have been made to correspond with the security the West required? Could there not have been a division of Europe into spheres of influence which, while they would hardly have pleased everybody, might have prevented four and a half decades of superpower rivalry?

Stalin appears to have relished his role, along with Roosevelt and Churchill, as one of the wartime 'Big Three'. Such evidence as has surfaced from Soviet archives suggests that he received reassuring reports about Washington's intentions. 'Roosevelt is more friendly to us than any other prominent American,' Ambassador Litvinov commented in June 1943, 'and it is quite obvious that he wishes to cooperate with us.' Even if Stalin's long-range thinking about security did clash with that of his Anglo-American allies, common military purposes provided the strongest inducements to smooth over such differences. It is worth asking why this practice of wartime cooperation did not become a habit that would extend into the post-war era.

The principal reason, it now appears, was Stalin's insistence on equating security with territory. Western diplomats had been surprised, upon arriving in Moscow soon after the German attack in the summer of 1941, to find the Soviet leader already demanding a post-war settlement that would retain what his pact with Hitler had yielded: the Baltic States, along with portions of Finland, Poland and Romania. Stalin showed no sense of shame or even embarrassment about this. When it came to territorial aspirations, he made no distinction between adversaries and allies: what one had provided, the other was expected to endorse.

On the surface, this strategy succeeded. After strong initial objections, Roosevelt and Churchill did eventually acknowledge the Soviet Union's right to the expanded borders it claimed. They also made it clear that they would not oppose the installation of 'friendly' governments in adjoining states. This meant accepting a Soviet sphere of influence from the Baltic to the Adriatic, a concession not easily reconciled with the Atlantic Charter. However, unlike Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill would have to defend their decisions before domestic constituencies. The *manner* in which Soviet influence expanded was therefore, for them, of no small significance. Stalin showed little understanding of this. Having no experience himself of democratic procedures, he dismissed requests that he respect democratic proprieties. At Yalta Molotov warned his boss that the Americans' insistence on free elections in Eastern Europe was 'going too far'. 'Don't worry,' he recalls Stalin as replying, 'We can deal with it in our own way later. The point is the correlation of forces.' The Soviet leader was right. Military strength would determine what happened in that part of the world, not lofty principles.

*What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]*







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