

**CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS**

Cambridge International Advanced Subsidiary and Advanced Level

## **MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2014 series**

### **9389 HISTORY**

**9389/23**

Paper 2 (Outline Study), maximum raw mark 60

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## Generic levels of response

### Part (a)

#### **Level 4: Evaluates factors** **[9–10]**

Answers are well focused and identify and explain a range of factors. Answers are supported by precise evidence and demonstrate clear understanding of the connections between causes. Answers consider the relative significance of factors and reach a supported conclusion.

#### **Level 3: Explains factors** **[6–8]**

Answers demonstrate good understanding of the demands of the question providing relevant explanations, supported by relevant and detailed information. Answers are clearly expressed. Candidates may attempt to reach a judgement about the significance of factors but this may not be effectively supported.

#### **Level 2: Describes factors** **[3–5]**

Answers show some knowledge and understanding of the demands of the question. Answers are either entirely descriptive in approach with few explicit links to the question, or they provide some explanation which is supported by information which is limited in range and depth.

#### **Level 1: Describes the topic/issue** **[1–2]**

Answers contain some relevant material but are descriptive in nature, making little reference to causation. Answers may be assertive or generalised. The response is limited in development.

#### **Level 0: Answers contain no relevant content** **[0]**

### Part (b)

#### **Level 5: Responses which develop a sustained judgement** **[18–20]**

Answers are well focused and closely argued. Arguments are supported by precisely selected evidence. They will lead to a relevant conclusion / judgement which is developed and supported. They will be fluent and well organised.

#### **Level 4: Responses which develop a balanced argument** **[15–17]**

Answers will show explicit understanding of the demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument supported by a good range of appropriately selected evidence. They will begin to form a judgement in response to the question. At this level the judgement may be partial or not fully supported.

#### **Level 3: Responses which begin to develop assessment** **[10–14]**

Answers will show a developed understanding of the demands of the question. They will provide some assessment, supported by relevant and appropriately selected evidence. However, these answers are likely to lack depth and / or balance. Answers will be generally coherent and well organised.

#### **Level 2: Responses which show some understanding of the question** **[6–9]**

Answers will show some understanding of the focus of the question. They will be either entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question or they may contain some explicit comment with relevant but limited support.

#### **Level 1: Descriptive or partial responses** **[1–5]**

Answers may contain descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question. They may only address part of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit comment on the

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question which lacks detailed factual support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. Answers may be fragmentary and disjointed.

**Level 0: Answers contain no relevant content**

**[0]**

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## Section A: European Option

### Modern Europe, 1789–1917

#### 1 France, 1789–1804

**(a) Why did the Jacobins gain power in 1793? [10]**

The most important aim of the Jacobins was to save the Revolution. In 1792, France was in danger from foreign enemies. Its army was weak and poorly led, in contrast to the armies of Austria and Prussia that it faced. There were also regions of France where counter-revolutionaries were strong. The revolutionary parties were weak and divided. In contrast, the Jacobins built a large party of supporters in some provinces, in the south, for example, whilst they appealed to the Parisian sans-culottes. Their programme was comparatively simple: to save the Revolution from its enemies, especially those within France. They overcame rival groups such as the Girondins and focused on the King as the most important enemy of the Revolution and traitor to France because of his dealings with foreign countries, proved particularly by the Flight to Varennes. The surge of support led to the Jacobin Terror, which resulted in the short term to massive support. The Jacobins also embraced policies to deal with inflation and other economic problems, for example introducing maximum prices and paper money (assignats). The extremely radical measures such as Dechristianisation were not a reason why the Jacobins came to power but reflected how they used radicalism to crush moderate alternatives.

**(b) Which social group benefited more by 1804 from the changes introduced by Napoleon: the middle class or the peasantry? [20]**

Answers that reach the highest levels should be able to distinguish between different groups and link them to specific developments. A strong case can be made that the middle classes gained most. Property rights were guaranteed during the years of moderate reform from 1789 to 1792 and then by the Directory and Consulate. They were not seriously threatened as a class by the Jacobins. Changes in the fiscal system removed many of the grievances of the ancien regime. The level of Church impositions was lowered. This benefited the middle class and the peasantry but there were few gains specifically for the urban and rural poor. The poorest in rural areas made few gains in property. Conditions in towns did not improve. The relevant period did not bring democracy to France but the middle classes were used in administration. Napoleon's economic policies were partly intended to appeal to the middle classes, for example in the encouragement of trade, but war prevented more being done. The Continental System was against the interests of free trade and the merchant groups. Candidates might consider the consequences of the legal changes that gave some security to most people. Education was widened, in theory for all children, but again in practice for the middle class. Candidates might consider women as a distinct social class. This will be allowable and answers can explain that the Consulate reversed some of the gains made earlier by women.

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## 2 The Industrial Revolution, c.1800–1850

### (a) Why were railways important to the Industrial Revolution? [10]

Moderate answers might comprise mostly descriptive accounts. The distinguishing feature of better answers is that the latter concentrate on analysis of ‘Why?’ supported by examples. Railways began mostly as a useful means to carry more goods. In Britain, the earliest lines were in the north of England, for example, Stockton to Darlington and Liverpool to Manchester, and it was not a coincidence that these regions were more industrialised. The pattern continued as railways thrived. The same link was apparent in France and Germany. Bulky goods such as coal and iron could be transported quickly and more cheaply than on roads, canals and rivers. It was not long before agricultural goods were carried in larger volumes. This helped to build up towns. Railways also provided support for employment and encouraged industrial innovation, as in the building of trains and developments in civil engineering. Railways became a centre of investment, although the profits were not always certain. There were periods of boom but also examples of bust as railway investments failed. The creation of an urban industrialised working class would not have been possible without railways.

### (b) How far was the Industrial Revolution accompanied by the growth of urbanisation? Refer to any two countries in your answer. [20]

‘How far’ means that those more successful candidates will be aware of the limits as well as the growing extent of urbanisation. Britain saw the largest growth of towns with a changing balance of population. The census of 1851 first recorded a majority of the population living in towns. However, urbanisation was not a uniform pattern. The larger towns and cities were centred in industrial areas in the north and the midlands. London outstripped other British towns as a market and centre of redistribution for industry. But other regions were little touched by urbanisation. The south-west of England might be given as an example. The same tendency was apparent in Wales and Scotland: some highly industrialised places with large towns and few towns of considerable size in non-industrialised regions.

The increase in population was less marked in France and the position was patchy in Germany. Within this context, the link between industrialisation and urbanisation was still apparent. Industry provided employment. Larger factories were more economic in towns. The larger towns and cities also provided markets and centres of communication with railways growing by the middle of the nineteenth century. The absence of regulations meant that there were no inhibitions to building housing and manufacturing centres, although this meant that living and working conditions were very poor. The same factors applied to France and Germany.

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### 3 The Origins of World War I, c.1900–1914

**(a) Why did Russia go to war with Germany and Austria in 1914? [10]**

Answers at the highest level can be expected to distinguish between Germany and Austria. Although they were linked, there were differences that can be noted. Most of the answers can be expected to deal with the Sarajevo crisis, but this alone will probably not deserve Level 1. The Balkans were the focus of concern but they alone will not explain the war with Germany. The deterioration in Russo-German relations began with William II's decision not to renew the Reinsurance treaty with Russia. The Franco-Russian treaty followed in 1892. Although Russia and Germany had no directly conflicting interests, their relations were affected by Austria. Austria and Russia were rivals in the Balkans because of conflicting attitudes to nationalism in the region. Candidates can explain attitudes to crises before 1914. The final crisis revolved around Serbia and responsibility for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Russian mobilisation became crucial. Germany feared a war on two fronts. Neither Russia nor Austria felt that they could step back. When war broke out, Germany argued that Russian mobilisation meant war; Austria insisted that Serbia should be punished, Russia claimed that it was forced into war by German and Austrian intransigence.

**(b) 'Both of the major alliances before World War I were essentially defensive.' Assess this judgement. [20]**

Most of the more successful answers can be expected to consider alternatives and come to a clear conclusion. Another characteristic of the better answers is that they will discuss the policies of individual countries rather than the alliances generally. Answers that question the unity of the alliances should be credited highly. In the Triple Alliance (Austria, Germany and Italy) the priorities of the members were different. Austria wished to defend its position against nationalism, with Russia as the greatest danger. Germany wanted to assert itself as a world power and to safeguard itself against a resurgent France. Italy was a lukewarm member. Its motives were mostly anti-French because of their rivalry in Africa. The Triple Entente saw France as distinctly anti-German. Russia wanted an ally when it was ditched by Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Britain was suspicious of continental entanglements, but became more hostile to Germany when the Naval Race threatened its world influence. It had few concerns about Austria and Russia, even fewer about Italy, beyond a general wish to see peace in the Balkans.

Each of the treaty agreements had in common that countries would come to the aid of their partners if they were attacked. These issues might point towards confirmation that the alliances were defensive. It can be claimed that the alliance system was reasonably successful in preserving peace until the Sarajevo crisis of 1914. For example, the Morocco crisis of 1905–06 was resolved but not without leaving Germany dissatisfied. Austria refused to back Germany. Some critical developments took place without reference to the alliances, for example the Naval Race. All candidates can be expected to spend more time on the Sarajevo crisis of 1914; a characteristic of better responses will be that they will range more widely. 1914 showed how Germany backed Austria but Italy did not. France supported Russia but Britain took a more cautious line.

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#### 4 The Russian Revolution, 1905–1917

**(a) Why did the Bolsheviks emerge as a strong radical group by April 1917? [10]**

This clearly excludes discussion of the years before 1914. It can be argued that the war was in their favour because of the extreme problems facing the tsarist and Provisional governments in Russia. As conditions worsened, people were willing to look favourably on the extreme but simplistic programme of the Bolsheviks. Lenin and other leaders were still in exile in 1914. He did not return to Russia until after the February Revolution in 1917. But exile did not prevent the Bolshevik leaders from spreading their ideas in Russia. Control of radicals by tsarist agents lessened. The Bolsheviks did not play a significant part in the February Revolution, but they became more important and numerous as Lenin realised the importance of the Soviets. He also changed tactics to win more support from the rural peasantry whom he had previously disregarded. Through the Soviets, Lenin was able to appeal to the soldiers. When Kerensky proposed a constituent assembly, Lenin countered with the demand of power to the Soviets. His public statements laid less emphasis on forms of government and more on the popular grievances of Peace, Land and Bread.

Membership of the Party increased between the revolutions from about 20 000 to 200 000. The strength of the Bolsheviks increased as the Provisional Government declined. Whilst Lenin stuck to the overall strategy of gaining power through a revolution rather than an election which he would probably lose, he changed his tactics. This allowed his party to recover quickly from the setback of the July Days. Having refused to co-operate earlier with Kerensky, he lent support to the Provisional Government to defeat Kornilov's attempt at a coup d'état. The October Revolution was won by a combination of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviets.

**(b) 'By 1914, Nicholas II's government had recovered from the effects of the 1905 Revolution.' Assess this claim. [20]**

The key issue is the comparison of the state of the Tsar's government in 1905 and 1914. Answers should not go beyond the terminal date except possibly for some brief concluding comments. Candidates might focus on 'completely'. At face value, it can be argued that Nicholas II had reaffirmed his autocracy. The protestors of 1905 had gained none of the things that they had demanded. The Duma was introduced to win over those who sought a more limited form of government. The concessions that it represented had been whittled away through restrictive revisions of the franchise and the restatement of the Tsar's autocracy in the Fundamental Laws. The opposition was more divided by 1914. The split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks had widened. Other facets changed to add to the stability of Russia. The economy was improving. Spending on the military increased.

On the other hand, Nicholas II remained reactionary and had lost some of the faith that people had in him. Stolypin carried out reforms but without the support of the Tsar. Nicholas II could rely on the police and army but, even with their support, could not put an end to the strikes and civil unrest. Russia seemed stable in 1914 but this stability needed the avoidance of major problems. This point can be made generally. It will not be necessary, and will probably be irrelevant, to provide details of 1914+. The most convincing – but not necessarily the 'right' answer – might be that the Tsar's government had recovered, but not completely.

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## Section B: American Option

### The History of the USA, 1840–1941

#### 5 The Expansion of US Power from the 1840s to the 1930s

##### (a) Why did the USA not join World War I until 1917? [10]

There were a number of reasons why the USA did not join World War I until April 1917. Firstly, ever since the USA was formed, it was tradition for the USA not to get involved in wars between European powers. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 expressed this most clearly. Secondly, by the 1910s the USA contained many immigrants from European countries on both sides of the war. Though most Americans identified with Britain and France, there were large minorities of Germans and Irish which supported the Central Powers. The Jews in America also opposed the third member of the Allies, Russia, itself far from democratic. As Woodrow Wilson said in 1914, 'We have to be neutral, otherwise our mixed populations would wage war on each other'. Thirdly, the war threatened no major American interest. The loss of American life in the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May 1915 was potentially serious enough to force the USA to war but Germany abandoned the submarine warfare policy which had caused those deaths. There were no major economic interests at stake so long as the USA could trade with the Allies. (The policy of neutrality was interpreted so as to favour the Allies.) In 1917, Germany's return to unrestricted submarine warfare and its wooing of Mexico, as revealed by the Zimmermann telegram, did threaten US interests. The USA then joined the war.

##### (b) How far were US relations with the great powers of Europe affected by the Civil War? [20]

Three European states, Britain, France and Russia, are the great powers concerned. 'US' is taken to mean the government in Washington D.C. The Civil War saw Russia, smarting from the Crimean war, a steadfast ally of the North throughout, united by a common dislike of Britain in North America – and unusually a commitment to abolishing unfree labour. France, led by Napoleon III, had imperial designs in the Americas; it tried to exploit the Civil War by installing a Habsburg prince, Maximilian, as Emperor of Mexico in 1864. Once the Civil War had ended, the USA, quoting the Monroe Doctrine, demanded the withdrawal of French troops and the abdication of Maximilian. The French left in 1866, Maximilian was executed in 1867. Thus Franco-US relations were very strained for most of the 1860s.

As for the UK, relations in the 1840s and 1850s had not been good; the US had assisted Russia during the Crimean war. These tensions remained at the start of the Civil War. Cotton trade tied the UK more closely to the South, as did a British preference for the less boisterous culture of the South. Thus when, in November 1861, the USA seized two Confederate diplomats on their way to the UK in a British vessel, the *Trent*, a major crisis occurred. The UK even sent troop reinforcements to Canada as a warning. The USA saved the day by releasing the Confederate agents. Relations between the USA and the UK were further strained when, in July 1862, the *Alabama* escaped from a British dockyard where it was being built, was quickly converted into a warship and inflicted much damage on Northern shipping. The final crisis came in October 1862 when the UK was close to mediating in the Civil War. By then, however, the war was changing. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation did much to swing British public opinion behind the North. Thus US relations with both the UK and France suffered as a result of the Civil War. Only relations with Russia changed little.



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## 6 Civil War and Reconstruction, 1861–1877

### (a) Why did Congress impeach President Johnson in 1868? [10]

Almost as soon as Andrew Johnson, originally a Democrat from Tennessee, became president in April 1865, he began his own version of Presidential Reconstruction of the South which provoked Republicans in Congress. This version was too generous towards white rule in Southern states. Voter qualifications were based on the 1860 records, which excluded blacks from voting. The new-found freedoms of Southern states allowed them to introduce Black Codes limiting the freedoms of ex-slaves. The 40<sup>th</sup> Congress, elected in November 1866 with Republican supermajorities in both Houses, determined that leadership of Reconstruction should pass from President to Congress. Johnson was determined to resist. Congress passed laws, Johnson vetoed them, Congress used its supermajorities to override the President; this happened with three Reconstruction Acts and the renewal of the Freedmen's Bureau. In 1867, Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act, which stated that the President could not dismiss a federal official until Congress had approved a successor. Johnson still went ahead and dismissed the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. This direct challenge to the authority of Congress meant that the House could find enough votes to agree to impeach the President for 'high crimes and misdemeanours'. Congress impeached Johnson because he ignored the law of the constitution and the realities of party politics after the Civil War.

### (b) How successful was Radical Reconstruction? [20]

Radical Reconstruction was the set of policies towards the South followed by Congress from 1866 to 1874. President Johnson opposed these policies while President Grant supported them. The aim was to rebuild the Southern states in the interests of the black minority as well as the white majority. Southern states had to amend their constitutions to provide political rights for ex-slaves. Social and economic reform, such as land redistribution, received little attention. Blacks were elected to public office in many Southern states. The Freedmen's Bureau worked to help the blacks, especially by building public schools in the late 1860s. In order to achieve these goals, the South was divided into five military districts; some 20 000 federal troops supervised Southern public life to make sure federal requirements were implemented.

By 1870, all states had been readmitted to Congress. In 1870–71 three Enforcement Acts were passed by Congress, which enabled the Grant administration to take action against the Ku Klux Klan. White resistance to Reconstruction continued with terrorist groups such as the White League being formed in the 1870s. Gradually, Northern Republicans turned their attention away from the South, especially following the economic recession which followed the panic of 1873. Once Southern states were readmitted to Congress, Democrats started to make gains in federal elections. In the 1876 presidential election, a freak result led to the 'compromise of 1877', whereby the Republicans won the presidency while the Democrats regained control of the South, ending federal support for the ex-slaves. The ability of federal government to impose policies on a region which were opposed by the majority of that region could not be sustained, at least in the context of the mid-nineteenth century. The success of reconstruction was limited in scope and time.

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## 7 The Gilded Age and the Progressive Era from the 1870s to the 1920s

### (a) Why, in 1920, did the USA give women the right to vote? [10]

A constitutional amendment giving women the vote was first drafted in 1878; it became law 42 years later. The main reason why the amendment was approved in 1920 was that the president and both political parties were in favour of doing so. President Wilson's attitude towards female suffrage is usually described as 'lukewarm' until 1918, when he eventually spoke in public in favour of votes for women, using their war efforts to justify his support. By then, the House of Representatives was strongly in favour, the Senate much less so. One year later, both Houses approved the amendment, three-quarters of the states doing so by August 1920. These events of 1918–20 were the culmination of many decades of political agitation to give women the political rights which men, white and black, already had. Societies such as the American Woman Suffrage Association argued the case for female suffrage and had some success at state level, especially in the West. The success of the Progressive movement in other areas, such as popular election of US Senators, revived the women's suffrage cause in the 1912 elections but only the First World War, fought in the name of democracy, made male politicians accept that excluding women from the right to vote was indefensible.

### (b) How far do you agree that President Wilson did more for the Progressive cause than did President Theodore Roosevelt? [20]

This assertion is counter-intuitive: Theodore Roosevelt (TR) was a Republican, Wilson (WW) a Democrat. TR's third party candidature in 1912 allowed WW to win. TR withdrew in 1916 in order to stop WW. WW's victory in 1916 was very close: California was the key state, which he won by a few thousand votes. When it came to WW's domestic policies, however, he followed closely the policies of TR. TR's Square Deal consisted of conservation, control of corporations and consumer protection. Thus, among many other reforms, he established five national parks, set up the Department of Commerce and Labour, introduced 'trust-busting' policies and persuaded Congress to pass the Pure Food and Drugs Act. He aimed to reduce the power of sectional interests, whether business, labour or party political.

WW's 'New Freedom' initiative of 1912 was directed against 'the Triple Wall of Privilege': tariffs, which protected big business; banks, which harmed small businesses; trusts, which were anti-competitive and anti-consumer. Thus, in 1913, WW manipulated public opinion to make Congress pass the Underwood-Simmons bill, which cut tariffs to levels not seen since the 1850s, he introduced the Federal Reserve banking system and the Federal Trade Commission and he supported the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914. WW even continued TR's conservation policies, establishing more national parks. In his second term he also supported votes for women, another Progressive cause. Wilson's progressive domestic policy of his first term is often overlooked in favour of the more dramatic foreign policy of his second term. The war caused some of his policies to become less progressive, for example the Espionage and Sedition Act of 1917. How far the reactionary, repressive policies associated with the Red Scare of 1918–19 should be associated with WW is a matter of debate. They did occur during his presidency.

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## 8 The Great Crash, the Great Depression and the New Deal, 1929–1941

### (a) Why did Franklin Roosevelt win the presidential election of 1932? [10]

The main reason was the poor state of the economy and the inadequate leadership of Herbert Hoover, the Republican president. By November 1932, the economy had been in a state of depression for three years. Around one in five workers was unemployed. When nominated as the Democratic Party candidate in July 1932, Franklin Roosevelt had said 'I pledge you, I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people'. Two aspects of FDR's campaign won him support: his use of the new medium of radio, to which his voice was well suited, and the campaign song *Happy Days are Here Again*. His campaign policies were relatively few and quite orthodox. His campaign message focused on the 'forgotten man' of US society, the underdog, and attacked the excesses of the few, the 'princes of property' for America's troubles. More important than the campaign of FDR, however, were the travails of Herbert Hoover. In 1932, he introduced policies such as an increase in income tax which, in both economic and political terms, was counter-productive. He was also seen as ultimately responsible for the army offensive against the Bonus Army camped in Washington DC, which resulted in very negative publicity. In addition, where the Democrats were united, the Republicans were badly divided, some advocating the election of FDR. Thus FDR won 40 states, Hoover just six, all in the North East.

### (b) How far does Franklin Roosevelt deserve to be described as the 'saviour of American capitalism'? [20]

The argument goes as follows. By 1933, the American capitalist economy, on the verge of collapse, was rescued by FDR's New Deal – or if not by the New Deal, then by the coming of war in 1940–41. Responses to the argument are best seen in terms of right and left. The libertarian right would argue that the premise of the assertion is wrong, that the US economy was not about to disintegrate. The right sees the Depression of 1929–33 as the working of the business cycle, made more turbulent than usual by dislocation of international finance and trade following the First World War. The New Deal, by introducing such reforms as the 1935 Social Security Act, undermined individual freedom and the free market economy. Even now, some modern right-wing Republicans wish to return the USA to the 1920s. The collectivist left would agree with the assertion, arguing that New Deal reforms, limited and piecemeal, saved US capitalism from complete collapse and prevented its replacement by a form of socialist egalitarianism. Though the left might accept the assertion, they would not see it as a positive assessment of FDR, whom they would see as a traitor to the cause of left-wing progressivism, if not to his social class.

Moderates of left and right would probably agree with the assertion but in a positive way. They would see the New Deal reforms as necessary responses to the economic crisis of the early 1930s, reforms which did enough to prevent the growth of more extreme left-wing populism / radicalism evident in Huey Long's Share Our Wealth. Left wing moderates, social democrats and heirs to progressivism, such as FDR himself, would argue that the social reforms of the New Deal were desirable in themselves, whatever the state of the economy, and a necessary response to the US becoming a mass democracy in the early twentieth century. Right-wing moderates, as could be found in both the Democratic and Republican Parties, believed that both social reforms and state intervention in the economy should be kept to a minimum to allow free market capitalism to prevail. The impact of the Second World War, quickly followed by the Cold War, changed the balance of economic and political forces, as the US economy remained militarised for decades to come. The social democratic model devised in the 1930s still remains the model. Most commentators would agree that FDR's New Deal, by modifying US capitalism did help to save the US economy.

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### Section C: International Option

#### International Relations, 1871–1945

#### 9 International Relations, 1871–1918

##### (a) Why did the USA declare war on Spain in 1898?

[10]

US fears that ambitious European nations would renew their interest in gaining colonies in the Americas had led to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. At that time, the USA was in no position to enforce it, having to rely on Britain (keen to protect its own overseas interests). However, the last 30 years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw rapid industrial expansion in the USA. With American industry heavily reliant on its own domestic market, which suffered an economic downturn in 1893, many businessmen and industrialists argued that the USA needed to find overseas markets. With the European market practising protectionism, this would mean seeking markets in China and the East. This would require the USA to develop a navy and establish overseas naval bases. This led to a political battle between those in favour of expansionism and those wishing to maintain isolationism.

In many ways, the debate was settled by events in Cuba, where Spain was struggling to maintain control of its long-standing possession by defeating independence fighters. The USA maintained neutrality until an explosion aboard the American battleship *Maine* in Havana harbour. Although the American government seemed to believe that this was the result of an accident, public opinion, inflamed by the press, believed that Spain was responsible. The government was heavily criticised for its weak response to what was perceived as Spanish aggression against the USA. In April 1898, the US government formally declared war on Spain. Victory in the war left the USA in effective control of the Caribbean and in possession of former Spanish overseas territories such as Guam and the Philippines.

##### (b) Did the existence of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente make the outbreak of a major war more likely or less likely?

[20]

In terms of more likely, it could be argued that the alliances caused uncertainty, fear and tension in Europe, largely because of the secret nature of their terms. There was an 'arms race' between the two rival alliances, leading to the existence of two well armed camps. Just as French leaders were convinced that the Triple Alliance was an attempt to isolate and encircle France, so German leaders were convinced that the Triple Entente was an attempt to encircle and threaten Germany. These tensions led European countries to develop aggressive plans to be used in the event of war (e.g. Schlieffen Plan). As a result of the alliances, France helped Russia to increase its military strength and speed of mobilisation. Austria-Hungary would not have gone to war with Serbia without the certain knowledge that it would be supported by Germany. The opposing sides in WWI largely mirrored the two alliances.

In terms of less likely, it could be argued that both alliances were based on vague treaties of friendship which did not compel countries to support each other in war, for example: France did not assist Russia when it was losing its war against Japan; Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, entered WWI in 1915 *against* Germany. Between 1907 and 1914, the alliances actually helped to maintain peace, preventing incidents escalating into war. For example, in 1911, Britain's threat that she would support France over the issue of Morocco led Germany to back down. Although Germany supported Austria-Hungary in its war against Serbia in 1914, it had not done so in 1913. None of the European powers went to war in 1914 as a direct result of their alliance commitments – they did so to protect their own vested interests.

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## 10 International Relations, 1919–1933

### (a) Why did Germany resent the terms of the Treaty of Versailles? [10]

German resentment focused on two main issues. Firstly, German representatives were not allowed to attend the peace conference – they simply had to accept terms which were imposed upon them. Secondly, the terms were not based entirely on Wilson’s Fourteen Points as Germany had expected. More specific factors included:

- Germany was forced to disarm, although it was clear that none of the victorious powers had any intention of doing so. Restricting the size of the Germany army would threaten German security and, at a time of intense political instability, make it difficult for Germany to maintain internal law and order
- Although theoretically mandates, Germany’s former African colonies were effectively taken over by Britain, France and South Africa
- Millions of people who were German in terms of language and culture would now be living under foreign rule (e.g. in Poland and Czechoslovakia)
- The Polish Corridor split East Prussia from the rest of Germany
- The War Guilt Clause seemed particularly unfair, given the complicated series of events which had led to the outbreak of war in 1914
- The amount established for reparations (£6600 million) seemed unreasonably high and imposed a commitment which, as Germany argued, was impossible to achieve.

### (b) How successful were attempts to improve international relations in the period from 1919 to 1933? [20]

In terms of success, it could be argued that tensions were greatly reduced during the period. The Washington Conferences (1920–21) provided a solution to the USA’s and Western Europe’s concerns regarding the growth of Japan in the Far East and the threat which this posed to their interests in China. The Dawes Plan (1924) found an initial solution to the problem of German reparations, enabling France to withdraw from its occupation of the Ruhr. The Locarno meetings in 1925 led to a series of treaties which seemed to offer the prospect of future peace, leading to improved relations between France and Germany. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 saw some 65 renouncing war, and it is significant that the USA, despite its isolationist policy, played a key role in establishing this. The Young Plan (1929) was another example of France’s new willingness to compromise with Germany. Moreover, Western Europe’s fear of communist Russia seemed to have faded, Britain, France and Germany all recognising its government and forming trade treaties with it.

In terms of unsuccessful, it could be argued that, despite these apparent improvements, underlying tensions remained. France was still deeply concerned about the threat which would be posed by a German revival and formed a series of security alliances. The USA’s refusal to ratify the peace settlement undermined the credibility of the League of Nations; indeed, it was the weakness of the League which made other conferences and treaties necessary. The USA’s isolationist policy meant that it only became involved in issues when its own interests were at stake. The failure of the Genoa Conference (1922) clearly showed the on-going tensions between Germany and France, tensions which were to lead to France’s occupation of the Ruhr. Despite the apparent success of the Locarno Treaties, France retained a deep suspicion regarding Germany. Moreover, the Treaties provided no guarantees regarding Germany’s borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was essentially meaningless, since no agreement was reached on what sanctions might be imposed on nations which broke their agreements. The failure of the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1932–33) clearly shows that tensions remained and that countries were not prepared to take the risk of reducing armaments. Relations between Western Europe and Soviet Russia remained volatile, as shown by the deep fears which The Treaty of Rapallo (Germany and USSR, 1922) caused in Britain and France.

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## 11 International Relations, 1933–1939

**(a) Why did Britain and France do little to oppose Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935? [10]**

Before 1935, Mussolini had adopted a diplomatic approach to foreign policy and had become widely respected abroad. Both Britain and France saw Italy as a vital ally in confronting the increasingly alarming threat posed by Hitler's Germany. When Mussolini ordered the invasion of Abyssinia in search of a glorious campaign to restore his flagging popularity in an Italy beset with economic problems, Britain and France faced a dilemma. Should they honour their commitments to the League of Nations or should they take no action in order to retain their alliance with Italy? Perhaps inevitably, national interests took precedence. In the absence of its own army, the League of Nations was dependent on individual nations contributing towards collective security measures. In both Britain and France, where public opinion was strongly anti-war, there was an understandable reluctance to commit to taking military action, especially over a far-away country that was of no particular interest to either country. Governments in both Britain and France believed that they were militarily weak and unprepared for war. Appeasement was the order of the day. It is ironic that, in opting to impose only minor sanctions against Italy through the League, Britain and France still managed to upset Mussolini sufficiently to drive him out of the League and towards an ever-closer association with Hitler.

**(b) 'Hitler's foreign policy in the period from 1934 to 1939 was based on lies and deceit.' How far do you agree? [20]**

In support of the view, it could be argued that Hitler's methods were devious and calculated, dependent on a combination of threats and conciliatory statements. He played the part of a man of peace, seeking only fair treatment for Germany. To Britain, desperate to avoid involvement in another war, his claims seemed plausible. Examples of lies and deceit might include:

- Non-aggression treaty with Poland 1934 – guaranteed Polish neutrality if Germany decided to attack Austria or Czechoslovakia and provided Britain with evidence of his peaceful intentions
- After the plebiscite returned the Saar to Germany in 1935, Hitler reassured France that this ended all grievances between Germany and France
- Signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement in 1935 with the aim of further weakening the Stresa Front against Germany
- Bluff over the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936
- The forming of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936 to ensure that Mussolini would not interfere with his plans for Austria. Also encouraged Mussolini to become involved in Spanish Civil War
- Promises made to Chamberlain at Munich 1938 regarding Czechoslovakia
- Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939 to ensure that the USSR would not interfere with his plans for Poland.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that Hitler had clearly spelt out his aims from the very beginning – for example, in *Mein Kampf* and in early speeches as German Chancellor. Stalin, for example, was well aware of Hitler's long-term intention to invade the USSR for lebensraum, signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact to buy time to prepare for it. Although he probably did not have a step-by-step plan of action, his long-term goals were very clear. Hitler was adept at isolating potential victims of German aggression – while this often involved making agreements which he had no intention of keeping, the main reason for his success was his exploitation of the weakness of others, particularly Britain and France.

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## 12 China and Japan, 1919–1945

### (a) Why had the Kuomintang achieved so little by 1925? [10]

Although Sun Yat-sen had been proclaimed Provisional President of the new Republic of China in 1912, he was quickly ousted from power by Yuan Shih-kai, who controlled the army. China descended into fragmentary chaos, warlords controlling local areas with their rival armies. Although, in 1917, Sun was able to establish a government in Canton in southern China, his authority was heavily restricted to the local area. Sun had established ambitious aims, based on his Three Principles (nationalism, democracy and land reform). This had enabled the KMT to forge an alliance with the CCP and to gain financial and organisational assistance from Soviet Russia. Prior to 1925, however, the KMT was simply not strong enough to compete with the power of the warlords. Sun was an intellectual and political philosopher, who had established the ideology of the KMT. It was left to the more pragmatic and military-minded Chiang Kai-shek, who became leader of the KMT following Sun's death in 1925, to take on the power of the warlords. Before 1925, the KMT was involved in internal development rather than attempting to gain control of China. For example, a military academy was established at Whampoa to train KMT officers, headed by Chiang following his own military training in Moscow. Chiang's brief was to develop an army capable of defending itself against the warlords and also begin to expand its power base outside Canton. It was only after 1925 that the KMT forces were powerful enough to achieve this – the KMT's well organised National Revolutionary Army, equipped with modern weapons from Russia and Germany, was then in a position to undertake the successful Northern March.

### (b) How far do you agree that China's weakness was more of a concern than an opportunity for Japan? [20]

In terms of 'concern', it could be argued that China's weakness had led to the involvement of the USA, Russia and Western European nations, keen to extend their own economic interests in the region. This created limitations to Japan's own ambitions within the region and, indeed, posed a possible threat to Japan itself. For example, Japan's 21 Demands had been significantly watered down by the power and influence of foreign countries, while Japan had little option but to agree to limit its own naval power at the Washington Conferences of 1921–22. The biggest fear was that Russia might try to take advantage of China's plight by extending its own political and economic influence over the East Asia region. Moreover, the USA in particular saw Japanese expansion in the region as a threat to the 'open door' policy with regard to trading rights in China. As a small, resource-poor country, Japan was vulnerable.

In terms of opportunity, it could be argued that China's weakness provided Japan with the prospect of extending its own influence within the region. With a rapidly expanding population and suffering from the effects of the world economic problems, expansion would provide Japan with more resources. With public opinion becoming increasingly ultra-nationalistic, expansion within China seemed more attractive, especially since it would provide vital supplies of iron ore, coal, etc. Many army officers believed it was vital to create economic self-sufficiency to avoid being blockaded into submission in any future war. The weak international response to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 suggested that further expansion was possible.