

HISTORY

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

9389/33 October/November 2015 1 hour

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet. Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen. Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid. DO **NOT** WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

This paper contains **three** sections: Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939 Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–50

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. The marks are given in brackets [] at the end of each question.

This document consists of 4 printed pages.



Section A: Topic 1

The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

It is certainly from 1867 that the historian can identify outbursts of public interest in foreign and imperial matters. Bouts of popular excitement and agitation accompanied a succession of events from the early seventies: the disappearance and death of David Livingstone; the Ashanti campaign of 1874; the purchase of the Suez Canal shares; the Afghanistan and Zulu disasters of 1879; Egyptian and Sudanese crises; the anxieties surrounding the possible imperial retreat of Gladstone's Fourth Ministry; the Jameson Raid; the Boer War; and so on. It would be a mistake, however, to concentrate too much on these imperial highlights. These were merely the surface ripples, occasionally whipped up into storms, of a much deeper intellectual and social current which had been set up in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the emergence of the new nationalism, state, nation and society converged, and the elite which promoted this convergence created new rituals, a whole range of invented traditions and cults through which it could be communicated to the public. Architecture, statues, public ceremonies, parades, displays and all manner of publications were bent to these ends.

The new traditions of Christian militarism, militarist athleticism in the public schools, and a recreated and perverted medieval chivalry contributed readily to the national rituals and political progresses which were part of the British imperial cult. The Queen was swiftly transformed from petulant widow to imperial matriarch. The army lost its old unpopularity and became a central element in national life. Cults of heroes from both the distant and more recent past were assiduously promoted through children's literature. Social Darwinism provided an ideological justification for colonial war and conquest which swiftly found its way into popular literature and school textbooks. Historians of the theatre have pointed to the remarkable topicality of the nineteenth-century stage and the excitements of the music hall.

There is a good deal of evidence from working-class autobiographies, other memoirs and oral evidence on the power of imperialism not only in the late nineteenth century but also in Edwardian times. Indeed, the most significant working-class testimony comes from the latter period. Anyone who expressed unpatriotic socialist tendencies in Alfred Williams' railway factory was mocked. Fred Willis recounted the imperial and racial content of geography lessons in his late-Victorian schooling. Robert Roberts described the pervasive nature of imperial and patriotic ideas, and the pageantry, publications and advertising through which they were expressed in his Edwardian Salford slum.

Further up the social scale, any amount of evidence can be produced. When Earl Attlee, the retired Labour Prime Minister, was asked to give lectures at Oxford University in 1960, he chose the subject 'Empire and Commonwealth'. In his first lecture, he described the excitements of youthful imperialism. When the news of the Jameson Raid broke, his father, a Gladstonian Liberal, was shocked, 'but to us Dr Jameson was a hero. On the wall at school hung a great map with large portions of it – our Empire – coloured red. It was an intoxicating vision for a small boy. We believed in our great imperial mission.'

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

In the five weeks between 18 September and 25 October 1941, events had moved rapidly. Hitler had reversed his earlier decision not to permit the deportation of Jews from the Third Reich until after the war and instead sought the unrealisable goal of a Jew-free Germany by the end of the year. The sites of the first extermination camps were selected. The testing of various methods of killing by poison gas were conducted. Jewish emigration from the Third Reich was forbidden. And the first 11 Jewish transports had departed for Lodz as a temporary holding station. The vision of the Final Solution – a programme aimed at murdering every last Jew in the German grasp – had crystalised in the minds of the Nazi leadership and was henceforth being turned into reality.

If the last pieces in the decision-making process came together quickly in the end, this fateful cluster of decisions itself was the climax of a long process stretching over a period of twenty-five months from September 1939 to October 1941. The commitment to some kind of final solution to the Jewish question had been inherent in Nazi ideology from the beginning. Thus Nazi Jewish policy had evolved through a series of final solutions, which first envisaged a Jew-free Germany through emigration and then a Jew-free Europe through expulsion. This process of radicalisation culminated in 1941 in the ultimate Final Solution of systematic mass murder. Jewish policy could evolve no further in concept. It remained only to be implemented through action.

What was Hitler's role in this fateful evolution? As the ultimate embodiment of Nazi ideology as well as the constant inciter and mobiliser of the party faithful, Hitler had certainly legitimised and prodded the ongoing search for final solutions. His obsession with the Jewish question ensured that the Nazi commitment would not slacken, that the search for a solution one way or another to this self-imposed problem would not fade away into obscurity or be indefinitely postponed. No leading Nazi could prosper who did not appear to take the Jewish question as seriously as Hitler did himself. Thus Hitler, simply by his existence, exerted a continuing pressure on the political system, which induced a competition among the faithful and ambitious to advance ever more radical proposals and to carry out Jewish policy in an ever more brutal and comprehensive manner. For many - the 'true believers' - this commitment to the Final Solution was a deeply felt conviction. For the unquestioning loyalists, it was a matter of completely identifying with Hitler. For eugenicists and planning experts, it was the opportunity to realise an agenda of their own that overlapped with that of Hitler. For technicians of many sorts, it was a chance to display their skills. And for countless others, it was a cynical exercise in political careerism, opportunism and accommodation. In the end the results were the same. The commitment to some kind of final solution permeated the entire regime, and acceptance of such a priority on the part of the regime characterised much of the German population at large.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

It is tempting to lay total blame for the Cold War on the delusions of Stalin and his lieutenants. A closer look at the Cold War from the Soviet side reveals, however, that they were not the only culprits in the conflict. We cannot disregard other, complex factors, such as the crass nature of power politics, choices of US and British policy-makers, and the deeper causes of hostility and mistrust between dictatorship and democracy in an uncertain world. Stalin, notwithstanding his reputation as a ruthless tyrant, was not prepared to take a course of unbridled unilateral expansionism after World War II. He wanted to avoid confrontation with the West. He was even ready to see cooperation with the Western powers as a preferable way of building his influence and solving contentious international issues. Thus, the Cold War was not his choice or his brainchild.

The arrangements at Yalta for Eastern Europe, and the critical victories of the Red Army in the Allies' ultimate triumph over the Axis powers, led Stalin to expect that the cooperative regulation of international relations would be possible. For this, by 1945, Stalin was ready to diminish the role of ideology in his post-war diplomacy with the West to a minimal level. He was ready to observe the limits on Soviet spheres of influence in Europe and Asia, and he was prepared to keep in power 'transitional' regimes in Eastern Europe that would be acceptable to the West. That did not mean that Stalin would cease to be the dreadful dictator and spiritual leader of the Communist world. It did mean, however, that the Kremlin leader believed he needed years of peace in order to bring the USSR from its wartime destruction, when six out of the fifteen Soviet republics were occupied and devastated by the Germans, to the status of an economic and military superpower.

After the death of Roosevelt, which signalled the end of the wartime bonds of friendship between Stalin and the Western leaders, and particularly after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Stalin began to have increasing doubts about post-war cooperation. Step by step, the revolutionaryimperial aspect of Stalin's thought and actions began to resurface.

Stalin's foreign and domestic priorities were limited in nature, and yet they led to tension with the West. Stalin wanted not only to restore order and strength to a country torn apart by war, but also to maximise the fruits of victory. He refrained from flying red flags all over the Soviet spheres of domination, yet he was determined to exploit Central Europe for his rearmament programme. The brutality of the Soviet regime and Stalin's cruel, scheming, and maniacally suspicious nature, which served these ends, looked first unacceptable and then sinister to the West.

Stalin's road to the Cold War, in the years from 1946 to 1950, was strewn with miscalculations. He did not want to provoke American and British 'imperialism', yet he overreacted to any perceived threat of it in Germany and in Eastern Europe. In response to the Marshall Plan, Stalin began to consolidate a Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe by ruthless police methods and intensive Communist propaganda. Trying to stop Western separatist policies in Germany, he triggered the Berlin blockade crisis. In short, Stalin's post-war foreign policy was more defensive, reactive, and prudent than it was the fulfilment of a master plan. Instead of postponing a confrontation with the United States and gaining a much-needed respite for recovery, he managed to bring it closer with every step.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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