Cambridge International AS & A Level

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HISTORY **9389/12**

Paper 1 Document Question **October/November 2016**

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 40

Published

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Generic Levels of Response

Part (a)

Level 4: Makes a developed comparison [12–15]
Makes a developed comparison between the two sources, recognising points of similarity and difference. Uses knowledge to evaluate the sources and shows good contextual awareness.

Level 3: Compares views and identifies similarities *and* differences [8–11]
Compares the views expressed in the sources, identifying differences and similarities. Begins to explain and evaluate the views using the sources and knowledge.

Level 2: Compares views and identifies similarities *and/or* differences [4–7]
Identifies relevant similarities or differences between views/sources and the response may be one-sided with only one aspect explained. Alternatively, both similarities and differences may be mentioned but both aspects lack development.

Level 1: Describes content of each source [1–3]
Describes or paraphrases the content of the two sources. Very simple comparisons may be made (e.g. one is from a letter and the other is from a speech) but these are not developed.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

Part (b)

Level 5: Evaluates the sources to reach a sustained judgement [21–25]
Answers are well focused, demonstrating a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Reaches a sustained judgement about the extent to which the sources support the statement and weighs the evidence in order to do this.

Level 4: Evaluates the sources [16–20]
Demonstrates a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Begins to evaluate the material in context, considering the nature, origin and purpose of the sources in relation to the statement. At the top of this level candidates may begin to reach a judgement but this is not sustained.

Level 3: Uses the sources to support *and* challenge the statement [11–15]
Makes valid points from the sources to both challenge and support the statement in the question. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 2: Uses the sources to support *or* challenge the statement [6–10]
Makes valid points from the sources to either support the statement in the question or to challenge it. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 1: Does not make valid use of the sources [1–5]
Describes the content of the sources with little attempt to link the material to the question. Alternatively, candidates may write an essay about the question without reference to the sources.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

Section A: European Option

Liberalism and Nationalism in Italy and Germany, 1815–1871

Garibaldi's Sicilian Expedition

Indicative content

1 (a) Compare and contrast Sources C and D as evidence of Cavour's attitude towards Garibaldi's Sicilian expedition. [15]

Source C is very indicative of the highly ambivalent attitude Cavour publicly gave out towards the expedition. It is likely that Cavour was well aware that the French would be very unhappy with what Garibaldi was out to achieve, and what Cavour is doing in the letter is to provide material for his ambassador in France to pacify French anger. He certainly did not do everything possible to stop it and his dealings with the Admiral in charge of the navy demonstrated that clearly and the 'except near Sicily' is revealing. All the reasons given for non-intervention are valid. D goes to the other extreme. While showing awareness of Cavour's need not to compromise the government of Piedmont in the eyes of Europe, it suggests that he was fully supportive and promised to help it, as well as giving practical advice. Given the speech was made in public after Cavour's death, there is no reason for its validity to be doubted.

(b) 'Italians supported Garibaldi's Sicilian expedition.' To what extent do Sources A to D support this view? [25]

Source A, from a well informed source in this context, shows that the Piedmontese King is supportive, and also refers to support coming from Genoa and the 'Mazzinians'. Cavour himself shows opposition, but there is evidence elsewhere to indicate that he was more ambivalent on the issue than is perhaps shown here. B is interesting in that it indicates that the King was less keen on the expedition than is made out in A, and that even Garibaldi himself had reservations until he 'had to help them'. C again shows Cavour's ambivalence on the issue, referring to it as a 'mad expedition', but it also makes clear the huge popularity of Garibaldi in Piedmont and the risk the government would take if he was stopped. D indicates that while the 'Government' may well have been opposed, but primarily for political and diplomatic reasons, the reality was very different. There was opposition from monarchs likely to be overthrown such as the ruler of Sicily and Naples as well as the Pope, but it was increasingly confined to a narrow section of the population.

Section B: American Option

The Origins of the Civil War, 1846–1861

Uncle Tom's Cabin and the Slavery Question

Indicative content

2 (a) To what extent do Sources C and D agree about *Uncle Tom's Cabin?* [15]

Source C, from a Southern writer, maintains that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* 'is nothing more than an interesting falsehood' and no 'equivalent for truth'. Source D, on the other hand, having asserted the forcefulness of the book, then argues that the book portrays Negro life 'with as much truth as vigour'. This is the fundamental difference between the two. The sources are similar in that they both recognise the talents of Harriet Beecher Stowe. Source C talks of 'the genius that pervades her pages' while Source D claims that the vigour of her prose has 'sent … electric currents through the great arteries of public opinion'. Source C is from a Southern writer who defends slavery, Source D from a British writer who is likely to be less familiar with the issue of slavery in the USA in the 1850s.

(b) How far do Sources A to D support the assertion that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* did little to change American attitudes towards slavery? [25]

Uncle Tom's Cabin was published in March 1852. Its author, Harriet Beecher Stowe, was a teacher from New England. She wrote *Uncle Tom's Cabin* as a response to the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. In its first year of publication it sold 300 000 copies in the USA and around one million in the UK. The book was also the basis of plays and musicals and was thus seen by many more people. The book had a huge cultural impact, its characters reinforcing certain stereotypes, e.g. Uncle Tom himself as the deferential African American. In the 1850s, it also had a political impact, though how great that impact was is hard to determine, given other developments in race relations, e.g. the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. Lincoln is alleged to have said to Harriet Beecher Stowe when he first met her in 1862, 'So this is the little lady who started this great war', but there is no evidence to support his story.

Two sources, B and C, broadly agree with the assertion while the other two, A and D, challenge it. However, Sources B and C could been seen as challenging the hypothesis in that the very production of *Aunt Phillis' Cabin* so soon after the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is evidence that at least one publisher believes that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is having a profound impact on US attitudes. These two sources are closely related. Source B is an advertisement for a book from which Source C is taken. Source C, written as a direct response to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, puts American slavery in a more positive light. It is generally reasonable in tone. It even portrays slavery as being necessary for the South 'at present', which could be taken to mean that it might not be necessary in the future. However, Source C is also very critical of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, which it calls 'an interesting falsehood'. Such criticism of such a bestseller is made with the intention of undermining its impact upon the American public.

Source B is an advertisement for Source C. Unlike modern adverts, it is very muted in tone. However, it makes some clear contrasts between the two books which emphasise the virtues of *Aunt Phillis' Cabin* compared with *Uncle Tom's Cabin*: referring to contemporary technology, it says the former is more a photograph than a painting. A painting is subjective, personal, a photograph objective and impersonal: 'the camera cannot lie'. A painting will have less effect than a photograph.

The other two sources, A and D, strongly refute the assertion. Source A argues that, at a time of great darkness on the slavery issue, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* enlightened the American scene. The great contribution of *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* according to Source A, was to refocus the attention of America and the world on the issue of slavery. Source D argues that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had a greater impact on the slavery issue than did any contemporary politician, including leaders such as Clay and Webster. Thus Source D rejects the hypothesis.

Evaluating the sources is straightforward on one level. The two sources supporting the assertion, B and C, are firstly, Southern sources and secondly, contemporary with the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* Of the two sources challenging the assertion, A and D, one is not even American – Source D – while the other is not contemporary and probably not Southern. These broad contrasts by themselves are not enough, however. More specific evaluation is required. The two Southern sources are probably the more open to careful scrutiny. Their provenance tells us that both were written within months of the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* Harriet Beecher Stowe's book must have alarmed and antagonised many living in the South, especially among the slave-owning class.

The sources tell us nothing about Mrs Eastman but almost certainly she came from that class. The extract from her book in Source C suggests she is trying to write a balanced, even-handed account of slavery as opposed to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, which was written from an abolitionist point of view. The advertisement for her book in Source B is further evidence of this point. The two reinforce each other, which is only to be expected. However, contextual knowledge would raise serious doubts about these sources. The number of fugitive slaves in the 1850s taking the Underground Railroad to the North and to Canada numbered 30 000 and 20 000 respectively, according to one specialist source. Though most slaves remained in the South, the departure of so many undermines the description of the South given by Sources B and C.

On the other side of the argument, Source A is written much later by an abolitionist. In part it is emotional in tone, in part it is more factual. The facts can be checked. Source A is more reliable than Sources B and C. It is also more reliable than Source D, which is a rather romanticised account of the impact of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* based on too many untested and dubious assertions. By a clear margin, the sources challenging the assertion are more reliable.

Section C: International Option

The Search for International Peace and Security, 1919–1945

Early Support for the Establishment of a League of Nations

Indicative content

3 (a) Compare and contrast the views of Britain (Source B) and France (Source C) regarding how the League of Nations should deal with warlike countries. [15]

Both Britain and France clearly wanted a League of Nations which would have the power to deal with '*warlike disputes*' and to prevent aggression by '*warlike powers*'. However, they differ over how the League should ensure compliance with its decisions.

The British view, as outlined by Lord Cecil in Source B, is that member states of the League would reach agreement that all international disputes should be referred to the League for consideration. If a country refused to submit to the League's arbitration of a dispute, member states should combine to '*use all means, even force*' to ensure that the rogue state was compelled to submit to the League's arbitration. However, the method which Cecil outlines for ensuring that member states combine in this way to ensure compliance with the League's decisions is somewhat vague, even contradictory. On the one hand, he uses the word '*bind(s)*' on two occasions, the implication being that, on joining the League of Nations, member states would be committing themselves to take any action, even military, which the League decided. On the other hand, he argues that no nation would be willing to surrender its sovereignty by allowing the League to '*dictate whether they should employ their forces in the settling of a dispute*'. This implies that each member state would be free to decide, in each individual case, whether to use its armed forces in support of the League.

It is this apparent weakness which concerns the French government (Source C). The right of each individual member state to choose whether to use its armed forces in support of the League in each individual international dispute could seriously weaken the authority and power of the League. At the very least, it would delay action by the League while member states debated what measures, if any, to take. The French believed that the League should be able to respond quickly and effectively to international disputes; without this ability, the League's credibility would be undermined, particularly in the eyes of vulnerable countries. The French government therefore proposed the establishment of a central organisation to coordinate military action by the League – essentially an international General Staff. The implication of this is that the League would have access to an international army, which could be deployed quickly and effectively. This concept of an international army is rejected by Cecil (Source B) as impractical, since no country would agree to it.

The two sources reflect the debate which took place over the wording to be adopted for Article 10 of the League's Covenant. Cecil would have been well aware of the French desire for an international army when he spoke in January 1919. France was deeply concerned with its own security, particularly fearing a resurgence of German power. It therefore wanted to ensure that the League of Nations had genuine power and authority. Britain, on the other hand, was not prepared to allow the League to dictate how it might deploy its armed forces; it saw this as a threat to its national sovereignty. Moreover, Cecil was addressing American journalists at a time when the USA was debating whether to join the League. Britain was keen to ensure that the USA did join the League and Cecil would have been well aware of the arguments used by the Republican-dominated Senate regarding the loss of national sovereignty which would result from membership of the League. He was, therefore, keen to assure the American journalists that this would not be the case.

At the Commission which drafted the Covenant, France proposed an amendment to the wording of Article 10 which would effectively have led to the creation of an international army. This proposed amendment was defeated.

(b) 'There was little prospect of the League succeeding.' How far do Sources A to D support this view? [25]

The horrors of the First World War led many international politicians to consider ways by which a repetition might be avoided in the future. In 1916, Lord Robert Cecil submitted a memo to the British government advocating an international organisation to settle future disputes between nations and help preserve world peace. Leon Bourgeois made similar proposals to the French government. The South African politician, Jan Smuts, advocated the same thing in his 1918 treatise '*The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion*'. Bourgeois and Cecil were honoured with the Nobel Peace Prize (1920 and 1937 respectively) for their work with the League, while Smuts was the only person to sign both the League of Nations' Covenant and the UN Charter.

During the Paris peace talks in 1919, a Commission was established to draft the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was at this point that idealism and pragmatism collided. While there was general agreement on the need for such an international organisation to maintain peace and security, nations were also keen to ensure that their national interests and sovereignty were not threatened. It was this concern which eventually led the USA to reject the League, its Republican-dominated Senate believing that isolationism was a better way forward than risking American lives in foreign wars in which the USA had no vested interests. As a result, the Covenant was rather vague, particularly over the extent to which nations were committing themselves to provide armed forces in support of decisions made by the League. The early advocates of a League of Nations were well aware of this dilemma and the threat which it posed to the League's prospects of success. The weaknesses of collective security were to be fully exposed during the 1930s.

In support of the hypothesis – Smuts (Source A) argues that the proposed League could only operate through the consent and commitment of its member states. He rejects the idea, which some had clearly advocated, of an international government as impractical, since no country would join a League which threatened its own national sovereignty. Similarly, he argues that the Great Powers would not join a League which made decisions by a simple majority of votes. Conversely, he is concerned that if decisions had to be unanimous, no decisions would ever be made. Thus, he sees the proposed League facing a dilemma – either an international government which no nation would accept, or a debating society which would make decision-making impossible.

The French delegation on the Commission which drafted the Covenant (Source C) was clearly concerned that the League would lack both power and authority. Without access to its own army or police force, the League would not be able to respond quickly and effectively to international situations. The League would be at the mercy of member states, which may or may not decide to support decisions made by the League regarding each individual problem. This, the French argued, would undermine vulnerable states' confidence in the League and would threaten the League itself.

Britain (Source B) had already made it clear that it did not support the French idea of an international army because it would undermine the national sovereignty of member states. Similarly, the idea of an international army would imply some form of international government, which is also rejected by Smuts (Source A). Although Bourgeois (Source D) clearly believes that the League of Nations could succeed, he argues that this success would be dependent on three conditions. These conditions all rely on the agreement and support of

member states; without their commitment and willingness to work together, the League would fail. Cecil (Source B) argues that member states would retain their own national sovereignty; as with Source D, this suggests that the League of Nations could only be successful if member states worked together in honour of their commitments.

In challenging the hypothesis – The title of Smuts' book (Source A) suggests that he believed there was a practical way in which the dilemma he outlines might be addressed so that the League could be successful in maintaining future peace and security. Cecil (Source B) suggests that countries would be prepared to work together to ensure that all international disputes were brought before the League for consideration because it was in their interests to do so. While retaining their national sovereignty and control over the deployment of their individual armed forces, countries would be committing (*binding*) themselves to supporting the League when they signed the Covenant. Cecil displays no doubt that the League would be successful in ensuring that all disputes were properly arbitrated.

This view is shared by Bourgeois in Source D. He argues that the League's success will be based on moral persuasion and that it is this which will enable the dilemma outlined by Smuts (Source A) to be overcome. Like Smuts, he argues that the League must operate '*by consent*'; no member state would be expected to take any action which had not been agreed to by its own government. As a result, member states will feel '*secure and at ease'* in accepting and cooperating with the League's decisions. Like Cecil (Source B), Bourgeois sees the League's tribunal as the arbiter of international disputes; countries would accept its decisions because they had already agreed about the fundamental principles of international law on which its decisions would be based.

Source A – Contextual knowledge confirms that Smuts was a strong advocate of an international organisation, such as the League of Nations, as a means of preserving future peace and security. The title of his book suggests that Smuts genuinely believed that the League of Nations was a practical concept. It is likely, therefore, that the somewhat negative tones of the extract in Source A are taken out of context, perhaps as a means of identifying possible problems before outlining practical solutions to them. The book was written before the end of WWI and the peace conference in Paris at which the Covenant of the League of Nations was drawn up and agreed. Therefore, it represents Smuts' personal views on how the League might be organised and the potential problems it might face. His concerns about the requirement for unanimous decisions were to become reality – decisions by both the General Assembly and the Council had to be unanimous.

Source B – As a strong advocate of an international organisation to maintain future peace and security, Cecil was appointed by the British government as its representative regarding all aspects relating to the establishment of the League of Nations (e.g. he led the British delegation on the Commission which drafted the Covenant during the Paris peace talks). The source is dated to just before the peace talks opened in Paris, although Britain would already have been aware of the French idea of establishing a kind of international army to ensure prompt and effective action by the proposed League of Nations. Britain did not favour this idea and knew that the USA would be almost certain to reject it. Cecil is addressing American journalists. Britain felt that it was essential for the USA to join the proposed League, but knew that President Wilson was facing fierce opposition from the Republican/isolationist lobby in the USA. Cecil is supporting Wilson's view that joining the League did not in any way threaten a country's national sovereignty.

Source C – At the Paris peace talks, France adopted a hard line in its demands for strong action against Germany. This was partly for revenge, but also because France feared a resurgence in German power which might again threaten French security. France was therefore determined to ensure that the League of Nations would have genuine power and authority, so that it could help protect France (and other vulnerable states) from Germany

(and other potentially aggressive nations). The French considered the draft wording of Article 10 (as outlined in Cecil's comments in Source B) as too vague and likely to weaken (or at least delay) the League's response to international problems.

Source D – Bourgeois was a strong advocate of the establishment of an international organisation such as the League of Nations. He represented France on the Commission which drafted the Charter. His speech was delivered in 1922, two years after the formal opening of the League. [It is actually his acceptance speech after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920; illness prevented him making the speech in 1920 and it was delivered, in written form, two years later.] The speech shows that Bourgeois was fully aware of the factors which might lead to the failure of the League, and stresses what needs to be done to ensure that this does not happen.